Peacebuilding
Listen to the locals
The United Nations have quite a lot of mediation practice in civil wars. The Human Security Center at the University of British Columbia recently reported that the number of wars ended by means of negotiation rather than victory by one party has grown since the 1990s (see D+C/E+Z 2/2007, p. 53). However, the research institute also emphasised that conflicts ended by peace settlements tended to flare up again twice as frequently as wars determined by outright victory. A recent evaluation of the UN Development Programme’s efforts in crisis countries has revealed some of the reasons.
On the one hand, international peacemakers and peacekeepers often focus too heavily on stabilising post-conflict countries in security terms, neglecting development-related tasks. On the other hand, there typically is a lack of funds. Once a peace settlement is reached, donors tend to lose interest, turning to other crises. Aid promised therefore often remains outstanding. A third reason, according to the evaluation, is the UNDP’s inadequate knowledge of the reasons for – and backgrounds of – individual conflicts.
The report is based on six case studies (Afghanistan, DR Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan), with additional data from another 24 countries and regions in which the UNDP has become active. In 2005, almost 40 % of UNDP funds went to conflict regions. In the UN system, the Development Programme is arguably best positioned to address structural causes of conflict – such as poverty, injustice or instability.
In order to do justice to this role, the UNDP must first define a strategic vision for working in conflict regions, the evaluation states. The authors write that UN involvement should be based on the observation of human rights, promotion of legitimate rule and strengthening of civil society. In many conflict countries, according to the evaluation, the international community places too much emphasis on superficially enforcing political stability. Too much attention, the argument goes, is typically paid to strengthening state agencies, whereas social needs remain neglected.
Second, development issues must be assigned greater priority in international peacekeeping missions, argues the evaluation. The UNDP must gain access to – and be able to advise – the UN Security Council, as do the UN High Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees; and development issues should become priority topics for the new UN Peacebuilding Commission. Third, the document proposes that the UNDP specialise in a set of core competencies, including the reintegration of war-affected populations, establishing locally-based government bodies, security-sector reform and poverty reduction. Fourth, the authors want the UNDP to improve its knowledge of the conflict regions, in which it becomes active, and educate its employees accordingly, both in the New York head office and in the countries of assignment.
Moreover, the evaluation recommends that the UNDP should improve its cooperation with other donors and international organisations such as the World Bank, but above all with local people in the target countries. The document bemoans a tendency to regard local people simply as recipients of aid – or as contractors carrying out tasks in the context of peacekeeping missions. Instead, the authors urge the UNDP to engage civil society in all its diversity in any given conflict region, because it provides local knowledge as well as access to local communities.
According to the evaluation, the UNDP followed this kind of approach in Afghanistan up to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. From its regional office in Islamabad, the Programme maintained intensive contact with Afghan civil society and, to a great extent, let non-governmental organisations implement its programme. Since 2002, in contrast, the UNDP has focused almost entirely on Afghanistan’s government bodies. Its approach has been top-down, neglecting the need to build local capacity. The assessors consider this a significant cause of the problems recently experienced by the international mission in Afghanistan. (ell)