State sovereignty and censorship

In January, Iranians were almost completely cut off from the rest of the world: the internet was shut down, cries for help could no longer be heard, and the flow of information from the country dried up. The government had often blocked communication networks in the past, but now, amidst massive demonstrations and extreme repression, even the one internet link that had otherwise always continued to function – the Starlink satellite network – was severely disrupted. It came as a shock to many, even beyond the Iranian opposition, that the regime had succeeded in paralysing most satellite connections. 

The Iranian regime has established a sophisticated system of digital blockades, surveillance and censorship. Experts believe that it cooperates to this end with the Chinese government and uses technologies supplied by Chinese state-owned firms. This would certainly tie in very well with China’s international internet policy and its notion of “digital sovereignty”.

Within China, the internet has long been subject to state control. Virtually all key infrastructure such as backbone networks, mobile networks and the principal internet gateways to other countries is run by state-controlled telecommunication companies. Strict regulations define the content requirements for platforms and applications wishing to operate within this infrastructure. The free flow of information across borders is by no means a priority in Chinese internet governance. This is also why the regime has been seeking for some time to impose its own norms abroad.

Free internet versus state sovereignty

Since commercialisation of the internet began in the early 1990s, a multi-stakeholder model has evolved in many ­areas of the global digital world: states, businesses, civil society and the technological community design and ­manage much of the internet. One central intention behind this approach is to ensure that non-state actors – especially private firms with an economic interest in global networks – make state censorship more difficult. 

However, by no means everyone shares this vision of the internet as a borderless and self-regulated realm that is not subject to conventional forms of state authority. Authoritarian states in particular have been rebelling against this notion for some time. China is foremost among them and is doing so with growing success. As so often, Beijing’s argumentation is rooted in the principle of state sovereignty – and in the idea that the multi-stakeholder model was heavi­ly US-biased, despite its liberal rhetoric. By framing the narrative in this way, China is striking a chord not only with other authoritarian regimes, but also with those positioned more in the middle of the ideological spectrum – somewhere between statist and liberal systems.

As the birthplace of the internet, the US still enjoys a structurally privileged position within the digital order. For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is crucial for the internet to function, remains subject to US jurisdiction. Registered in California, the non-profit organisation ensures, among other things, that web addresses (domain names) function consistently worldwide. China has long been advocating for such central tasks to be assigned to intergovernmental organisations like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

There have been calls ever since the early 2000s for states to take a more central role in regulating the internet. Then, in 2012, positions became more entrenched at the World Conference on International Telecommunications ­(WCIT-12). The issue being discussed was whether the ITU should also be responsible for internet-related matters – thereby raising them to the intergovernmental level. 

A China- and Russia-led coalition of 89 states, including many emerging economies and developing countries, signed a treaty containing clauses to this effect. However, 55 mainly Western member states refused to sign it because they were concerned about potential state control. 

China exports censorship software

Ever since, China has repeatedly taken a leading role in initiatives relating to state cyber sovereignty. In this context, Beijing has used its powerful voice on several occasions – including through non-Western blocs such as the G77 and BRICS+ – to persuade countries of the Global South to form coalitions within UN institutions. 

At the same time, China is using its Digital Silk Road, a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative, to export its own technical norms and standards to partner countries. Alongside physical internet infrastructure, China also frequently supplies embedded software that facilitates centralised control and censorship functions. 

Chinese tech giant Huawei, for example, installed telecommunications infrastructure in over 60 countries that contains tools allowing governments to monitor and censor online activities in real time. The technology has been actively used for state censorship in at least 17 cases, according to technology researchers Valentin Weber and Vasilis Ververis. 

Training in internet control

Technology transfer is often supervised by Chinese engineers who train local security personnel in how to use the tools. Chinese authorities also provide government agencies abroad with training courses and workshops on topics such as cyberspace control, public opinion management and monitoring of online dissent. Other countries model their own cybersecurity legislation on the Chinese system, which is clearly attractive to many states.

Is global interconnectedness at risk of collapsing if more and more states follow China’s example? Probably not. China and other authoritarian states do have an interest in remaining connected – if for no other reason than the economic importance of access to global markets and supply chains. It’s likely that the internet in authoritarian states will continue to be largely compatible with the rest of the world on a technical level, even if its degree of permeability is tightly controlled.

Liberal states are also in the process of negotiating how much state control they believe is necessary on the internet. If information flows too freely, this can destabilise not only authoritarian but also liberal political systems – for example, if they become the target of disinformation from abroad or if foreign powers attempt to influence them in other ways. Other aspects require consideration too, such as the need to protect children and young people from inappropriate content. It’s true that liberal states take a different view of digital sovereignty than China does and define different boundaries accordingly. However, laws such as the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) make it clear that the internet is increasingly subject to stricter rules and standards in Europe, too. 

Isah Shafiq is a student of political science at Goethe University Frankfurt and a student assistant at D+C.
isahshafiq@web.de