Boris Johnson’s misguided approach to the EU
I think that he only realised after the referendum that the EU is indeed not prepared to renegotiate Britain’s terms of membership. To gather from what he said long before the referendum, his strategy was to declare that Britain would quit in order to get better terms, believing that it was obvious that the EU would want Britain to stay. Indeed, many leading members of Britain’s Conservative party still seem to be unaware of the EU’s founding principles. They all appear to hope for access to the EU Single Market whilst limiting migration. The EU, however, is based on the free movement of capital, goods, services and people. It is impossible to strike new deals on migration without undermining the very foundations the EU is built on.
The approach of Johnson and other Brexiteers to the EU is basically one of foreign policy, not one of international cooperation. Foreign offices and their diplomats have always emphasised national interests as best they could, so concerns for the international common good or the feasibility of collective action were of lower priority.
That attitude made sense in the past, but it is outdated now. Today, the crucial challenges humankind faces – from environmental protection to the governance of digital networks, from stemming infectious diseases to fighting terrorism – require international cooperation. Of course it is tempting to free ride, to let others do the hard work and rake in as many benefits as possible, but neither the problems of a continental community nor those of the global one can be solved that way. International cooperation is about more than national interests. It is about ensuring the viability of human life on our small planet. In a similar sense, development cooperation is not just about transferring money. It must be geared to solving problems.
Acting in an upredictable, even erratic way can sometimes serve the national interest in international affairs. It may help to gain greater concessions from others. It may just as well be harmful, however, and trigger violent conflict, for example. If one considers international cooperation, in contrast, unpredictable and erratic behavious is always harmful. Partnerships require trust and stability, not recklessness and excitement.
Unfortunately, Johnson’s approach to international affairs is not uncommon. Far too many governments think along similar lines. In the European context, national leaders tend to take the EU for granted and focus on getting the most from it. Too few are willing to invest in and making it work. This attitude is evident in other international contexts as well. The UN is haunted by it, for example, and so is the African Union.
Losing Britain will make the EU weaker. But compromising on principles in order to keep Britain on board, would weaken it even more. The willingness to invest in the common goods would further decline, and many other national leaders would try to start renegotiating membership. The EU’s remaining members are quite aware of this, which is why they are unlikely to cave into British demands to limit migration within the EU Single Market.
Britain will be weaker too, by the way, and that seems to be dawning on many of those who supported the Leave campaign. It will lose its influence on European policy making, which has been considerable in past decades (London, for example, was the most enthusiastic proponent of eastern enlargement). And less influence in Europe means less relevance to allies from other continents. Commonwealth members in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, for example, wonder what Britain’s exit from the EU will mean for the Economic Partnership Agreements their own regional organisations concluded with the EU. Nurturing that kind of doubt in far-away capitals certainly does not enhance Britain’s standing in the world.