An end to tutelage
China, India and other Asian countries have developed in very different ways. Consequently, it is impossible to draft any consistent development policy for all poor countries simply by copying their models. Of course, it would be wonderful if Africa made the same kind of progress. So far, however, it is mainly higher commodity prices that have been driving recent impressive growth rates in Africa, after a long period of stagnation. Higher commodity demand in Asia thus has a greater impact than African developments.
Some lessons, however, can be learned. For example, it is clear that the private sector plays a major role. If the state restricts entrepreneurship too narrowly – or even prohibits it completely – stagnation and hardship prevail, as became evident in the first decades of Indian independence, and even more so in China under Mao Zedong. On the other hand, sheer market size is in itself a factor of success, once development takes off. No internationally active business wants to miss out on the potentially enormous markets of India and China. This simple investment incentive contributes to their growth.
It is also obvious that successful governments in Southeast and East Asia did not follow the doctrines preached by western donors in the 1980s and early 1990s. They did neither open their economies rapidly to the world market, nor across-the-board. Rather, they intervened in business affairs and fostered the international competitiveness of entire industries.
Many people in developing countries now believe that these success stories can be traced mainly to authoritarian rule. If despotism in itself were the key to success, however, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Myanmar should be shining examples of prosperity today.
It is undeniably true, however, that some authoritarian governments used their power to promote growth, rather than to plunder their countries. During the East-West conflict, systemic pressure to perform prevailed in Asia, probably contributing to this trend. Moreover, it seems true that economically successful regimes eventually tend to liberalise their rule. There are even signs of that happening in China. Of course, the People’s Republic is still far from being free; but the totalitarian terror of the Mao years is over.
In the meantime, one should not underestimate the progress made in democratic India, once Delhi began to ease the over-regulation typical of the initial post-colonial era. In India, and even more so in its smaller neighbour Bangladesh, non-governmental organisations have shown that, to some extent, they can make up for failures of governance, for instance in the fields of education or health. Civil society has thus also set examples worth following in other developing countries.
Since the turn of the Millennium, Asian influence is increasingly being felt in Africa. Unsurprisingly, economic interests mark the actions of the new partners, that are increasingly growing in strength. Many development experts in OECD countries now fear that money from China, India or elsewhere might undermine “their” efforts towards better governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Two comments on this. First, the new competition does not only imply risks, but also opportunities – for instance, in terms of more infrastructure investments. Second, anyone who argues that Asian influence will necessarily prove destructive, lacks confidence in the policy ownership of African target countries – as if Western tutelage alone could make development succeed.